Approaches to Moral Reasoning II: Character and Virtue by Cook, Patricia J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications Collection
2011
Approaches to Moral Reasoning II: Character and Virtue
Cook, Patricia J.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48622
Approaches to Moral Reasoning II: 
Character and Virtue 
Patricia J. Cook 
Visiting Assistant Professor of Ethics & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consider the case of the late Kenneth Lay, former CEO of the Enron Corporation. At the center of the story of the crisis and ultimate collapse of that corporation early in this decade, we find the son of a Bap-tist minister, whose is, by all accounts, a successful and likeable person, embroiled in fraud and decep-
tion that brought down the highly successful energy corporation he himself had founded. Lay protested, initially 
at least, that he had broken no laws, and had done nothing wrong, but was being publicly pilloried and harassed 
because of the unfortunate demise of the energy futures market during the "dot-com" technology stock collapse. 
People, he objected, were looking for a scapegoat upon whom to pin the blame for their frustrations over finan-
cial reverses. This might have been a convincing argument, but for the company-wide meeting in Houston, at 
which he spoke to Enron employees about the rumors of the imminent collapse of the company. During that 
meeting, Lay reassured the employees that the company was sound, and that the retirement investments (and 
life savings, in many cases) of those employees were secure. He encouraged those trusting employees to leave 
their investments in Enron stock, even while (it was subsequently revealed) he was secretly divesting his own 
billion-dollar portfolio of all Enron holdings. 
Lay and his subordinates, to be sure, caused widespread economic suffering and harm, and so were guilty of 
moral wrong-doing according to utilitarianism. They certainly failed in their moral and fiduciary duties to their 
employees, customers, and the investment public, and so likewise failed to "do their duty." But the chief ques-
tion that emerged when his personal behavior in the midst of the crisis came to light was, "what kind of human 
being is this?" In sum, people criticized the character of a person who could act with such callous disregard for 
basic integrity, let alone the welfare of others who trusted him. This evaluation of Kenneth Lay, the "man," 
seems to capture an alternative approach to, or conception of morality, different from those heretofore consid-
ered. It is the domain of what is sometimes labeled "virtue ethics." 
Heretofore we have discussed two fundamental moral templates. The first was based on the Principle of 
Utility. The second was grounded in what we termed "duties" or principles that restrict or constrain the means by 
which we are morally allowed to pursue worthy ends. These have historically been the fundamental statements of 
two significant and different conceptions outlining the basic structure of the moral life. The first calls attention 
primarily to the results or outcomes of our actions, and judges actions (or policies) as morally right or wrong 
based on their tendency to promote the public good (or to alleviate or prevent widespread human suffering). 
The second focuses upon "duty," that is, upon the obligations that each of us must recognize and, if we are 
morally worthy, to which we must deliberately and voluntarily make our individual behavior conform, regard-
less of the consequences. 
Sometimes these two conceptions-(l) the utilitarian, and (2) the so-called "deontological" (from the 
Greek deontos, meaning "duty")-are portrayed by moral philosophers as representing competing principles. If 
you've ever taken an undergraduate ethics course, chances are thi~ is what you were taught. On this simplistic 
portrayal, each approach was designed to be used as an algorithm (or decision procedure) for moral action. Each 
is represented as a complete and self-contained conception of morality (even though they are diametrically 
opposed to one another with respect to what determines right and wrong behavior). This portrayal might be a 
succinct and convenient summary, but it distorts what each conception demands, and misrepresents the extent 
to which each calls attention to complementary features of a moral life. What is more, it seems to ignore the 
principal questions raised in the example of Kenneth Lay, or, for that matter, Bernie Madoff. 
In this course, we want to take a deeper view of the moral life. While both Immanuel Kant and John Stuart 
Mill (mentioned above) discussed individual actions and behavior, both were more concerned to understand the 
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basic flundatiom of morality as an institution, rather than to construct iron-clad decision procedures that people 
can mechanically apply to each and every moral choice they faced. Our underlying assumption is that moral rea-
soning improves if we understand more adequately what morality comists in, what it is about. Simply providing an 
unreflective procedure for memorization and application would hardly have served that purpose. 
This is most evident when we turn to the question of character and virtue. Mill's conception of utilitarian-
ism, for example, makes considerable demands upon those who adopt it. It is not only (as in the case of Presi-
dent Truman and the atomic bomb) that the calculations are difficult to carry out, and that the quantifications 
are subject to controversy. Utilitarianism, as Mill observes, also demands that, when evaluating the sum total of 
benefit or harm to result from our actions, we remain strictly impartial. Our own interests and welfare, or those 
of our family and friends, are to count no more or less than those of total strangers. That is an extraordinary 
demand to make of moral agents. It is unlikely, in the example we considered regarding the first use of nuclear 
weapons, that President Truman thought himself bound by it. Likely, instead, President Truman did not feel 
obligated to extend to the Japanese enemy soldiers and non-combatants any more "impartiality" or concern than 
they themselves had extended to enemy soldiers and citizens (or to American and British prisoners of war) in the 
various Pacific-rim nations that they occupied. 
What we observe about all this is that the extraordinary demand for impartiality in utilitarianism places 
heavy demands upon the character of the moral agent, and highlights "fairness" and "loyalty" as "virtues" or excel-
lences of character to be cultivated. Likewise, utilitarianism could hardly succeed as an approach to moral reason-
ing if we could not presuppose the basic benevolence or good intentions of most moral agents. Someone who 
cares not a whit for the happiness or welfare of others, or who is too intellectually dense or psychologically insen-
sitive to conceive of what a generally desirable result might be, can hardly be put forth as a moral exemplar in 
this conception. As Mill himself remarked, rather testily, "there is no difficulty in proving any ethical standard 
whatever to work ill if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it!" 
One otherwise-puzzling feature of Kant's conception of the "ethics of duty" points in this same direction: 
namely, that an action derives its moral worth, not from its form, but from its underlying intention, and that an 
action is morally worthy not simply because it outwardly conforms to the requirements of duty, but only if, in 
fact, it is also done ·"for the sake of duty." But this is tantamount to saying that the moral agent must have an 
exemplary character, one which recognizes the rational demands of duty upon him even when there are no exter-
nal incentives or constraints to compel, constrain, or otherwise shape his behavior. A person who can be counted 
on to do what she ought to do, whether she can be made to or not, whether she derives any personal benefit or 
not, and whether she faces reward or punishment or not, must be a person of outstanding character.2 Thus Kant's 
philosophy, as well as Mill's, makes implicit assumptions about character. 
All of this iterates towards a third perspective on the moral situation, that both of our preceding "theories" 
or approaches address indirectly: namely, the quality or character of the individual moral agents engaging in these 
acts and living with their resultant outcomes. We might, that is, wonder not only: 
1. what outcomes or results we desire, and 
2. what kinds of actiom we may be enjoined or prohibited from undertaking to achieve those results, but also, 
finally, 
3. what are the habits or qualities of character we might be best advised to cultivate within ourselves in order to 
equip us to live the kinds of lives the other two conceptions recommend: namely, a life of duty, and of con-
cern for, and in service to, the public good? 
21 
10 An adequate picture of morality will include all three considerations. 10 
One of the original (and certainly the most famous) exponents of what we, in the present, term "virtue 
ethics" was Plato's principal student and critic, the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) Ancient 
Greek ethics is marked by a focus on the question: What is the good for man? Aristotle's answer is: eudaimonia, a 
250 uncompromising and srringent is rhis demand for virtuous characrer rhar Kant had rhe good sense ro wonder wherher any acrual 
human being has ever fully and complerely lived up co ir. 
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term often loosely translated as happiness (a matter of feeling well), but perhaps more accurately rendered as 
human flourishing (a matter of being well, or of living well). Our eudaimonia, Aristotle argues, is a life of excel-
lence: aspiring to, and attaining, excellence in what we are or are meant to be "by our nature." Aristotle illustrates 
this with a naval metaphor: just as a navigator of a ship may strive to excel in the practice or activity of navigat-
ing his ship, so human beings should strive for excellence in being human. What we human beings most essen-
tially are by nature, Aristotle observes, is rational, social animals. Our perfection is therefore constituted by 
habits of thought, feeling, desire and choice in accordance with Reason. All of this is displayed in character, and 
the excellences thereof. 
Aristotle's ancient Greek language makes this transparent. The Greek word "Charaktera" means mold or 
stamp; the Greek word "Ethos" means character, or habitual way of life. Thus, our word "character" bears the 
sense of "an acquired disposition" where there are discernable patterns of motivations and responses. When we 
are looking at someone's character, we are looking at the entire person over a complete life of steady moral effort. 
Character is thus a function of habit and practice, and will be manifested in a person's habitual behavior. In 
ancient as in contemporary usage, one's inner life (as well as outer actions) is included in the scope of character. 
Excellences of character are called "virtues." In Aristotle's world, any particular virtue is a particular excellence 
of character. Thus, a virtue is not a specialized skill or talent, but rather an exemplary way of manifesting the 
ideals and aims of a community in actions, thoughts and feelings. Virtues operate as habits for dealing with one's 
emotions, desires and actions that make a person good at dealing with the situations that typically arise in 
human life. In this sense, being good, being virtuous, is the same as being excellent. 
On its face, this is at once an obvious, and also a paradoxical approach to take to morality. On the one hand, 
we all want to live well, and to "be excellent." But, given our profound differences in situation, historical con-
text, and individual abilities, what can this mean? If we ask about a specific practice or profession-such as that 
of being a physician, a firefighter, or a military officer-we might be able to agree on a list of qualities or charac-
teristics that define "excellence" with respect to that particular practice. We might wish the doctor to be knowl-
edgeable about and skilled in the practice of medicine, and also wish that individual to be compassionate, caring, 
truthful, respectful, and so forth. Surely the firefighter must be brave, physically fit, and knowledgeable about 
the causes of fire and practiced in responses to fire that minimize its harm. 
15 Likewise, we might recognize a number of requisite characteristics that an "excellent" military officer would 15 
possess: honor, courage, integrity, physical fitness, for example, and the psychological disposition to be steadfast 
and unwavering in his devotion to duty. Like the doctor or the firefighter, we might also wish the military officer 
to be proficient in the knowledge and skills of her profession. It would avail the officer little to be a person of 
integrity if he or she proceeds to unleash destructive power on the wrong people, at the wrong time, or in the 
wrong place, or incompetently (i.e., in the wrong way). Note that, with respect to each of these practices, the list 
of "excellences," or what we might call "virtues of the profession" is a diverse list: some of the items refer to skill 
and intelligence, others seem to encompass careful and proficient practice (what we might call "prudence" or 
good judgment), and still others are transparently moral qualities, such as honor, truthfulness, integrity, and so 
forth. 
Once we recognize that it makes sense to raise such questions concerning specific and well-defined human 
practices, such as the various professions, we might then generalize the question, as Aristotle did, to apply to the 
more ambiguous and less well defined "practice" of "being a human being," or of living a well-rounded and fully 
human life. Are there (we might now ask) "virtues," a list of characteristics of excellence, that pertain to being an 
excellent human being, or to pursuing and living a good human life, per se? Presumably, if there were such a list, 
attempting to habituate ourselves in these ways, and to imbue ourselves with these proper habits of heart and 
mind, would lead to our flourishing, or to our "happiness," both individually and collectively. 
Unlike the utilitarian and "deontological" conceptions of morality, Aristotle offers nothing like a fundamen-
tal criterion or principle for resolving conflicts, let alone for identifying what specific acts we should perform in 
particular circumstances, strategies we should pursue, or what policies we might wish to enact (or prohibit) in 
our society. In the Nichomachean Ethics, he argues that excellence in action usually involves a sort of intermedi-
ate, a "mean," between extremes of emotion or tendencies to action. This does not constitute a "formula" or 
algorithm-although later interpreters down through the ages often mistook it as such, and labeled it Aristotle's 
"Golden Mean" (a phrase that Aristotle himself never uses). 
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What Aristotle actually proposed was the sketch of a grand conception of the moral life, incidentally includ-
ing this practical advice or rule of thumb of "seeking the mean." The "mean" was not a safe middle ground so 
much as it was the rational appropriateness of both feelings and actions. A specific virtue may often (though not 
always) be understood as the "mean" or mid-point between two extremes, one of which constitutes a deficiency, 
and the other an excess, of some given quality or desirable characteristic of behavior. His account of the virtue of 
courage constitutes an excellent example of how this prudential advice is to be understbod. Courage is described 
as a "mean" or mid-point between the vices of cowardice on the one hand (a deficiency), and recklessness or fool-
hardiness (an excess) on the other. (The lack, incidentally, of precise and unambiguous labels for these virtues 
and vices is another hallmark of this approach to moral reasoning.) 
Hitting the "bull's eye"-whether in marksmariship or in morality-requires patience and practice. We are 
likely often to miss the mark. But if we are to miss the mark, Aristotle also advises in this instance, it is often, but 
not always better to err on the side of an excess rather than a deficiency. Presumably, in the example of courage, 
if one cannot achieve perfect courage itself, one would prefer to be found a foolhardy hot-head than to be 
exposed as a sniveling coward. 
23 
20 These sketches of "the mean" do not present a foolproof method for moral reasoning, nor were they ever 20 
meant to do so. So, for example, Aristotle himself suggests some instances in which using "the mean" as a heuris-
tic would seem absurd: there is no "mean" or mid-point for behaviors like adultery, or robbery, or murder. Yet 
even where "the mean" does seem to apply, the concept is not a "doctrine" or a formal principle in anything like 
the sense intended by Mill's Principle of Utility, or Kant's formulae of the Categorical Imperative, and is surely 
not reliable as a foolproof guide to action in specific instances. In the American civil war, for example, it is well 
known that the Confederate general Robert E. Lee was neither himself a coward, nor would he have been likely 
to tolerate cowardice in his ranks. That said, in marked contrast to Aristotle's advice about preferring an excess to 
a deficiency, it is likely that Lee, in retrospect, would have preferred caution and cowardice at Gettysburg to the 
kind of spirited hot-headedness demonstrated by the brash young Jeb Stuart, whose undisciplined and disorga-
nized forays with the Confederate cavalry likely cost Lee that fateful battle, and thus the war. 
We have said that "Virtue Ethics" does not consist of principles for action (like the Principle of Utility) nor 
does it stress adherence to formal rules (as does deontology). Instead, it focuses on the agent, on what you ought 
to be in contrast to what you ought to choose or how you ought to act. This absence of precise directives derived 
from simple formulas is characteristic of "virtue theory" as an approach to ethics. Even less than the other con-
ceptions we have considered, Aristotle's conception hardly qualifies as a "theory." It is useful as a way of thinking 
about how individuals and societies might instill or habituate desirable traits of character in their children, 
pupils, professional apprentices, or citizens through moral education, prudent legislation, and wise example. It is 
of little use, however, in deciding what to do in certain vexed or confusing circumstances. Nor can we even pre-
dict with certainty what an individual possessed of the requisite virtues is likely to do when confronted with a 
specific moral dilemma. 
Instead, Aristotle's method is first to inquire into what persons and cultures actually do and believe about 
virtues, and then to weave these observations into a grand conception of the good life at which all persons of rea-
son and good will might sensibly aim throughout the course of their lives. Aristotle offers along the way, as in 
these cases or examples, what we might take as wise, sound, or prudent advice about cultivating the kinds ofbal-
anced, moderate dispositions that aid in attaining happiness and living a good life. Moral virtues are dispositions 
of feeling and action regulated by reason. Ultimately, the standard for what are the proper feelings and actions is 
the judgments of the good man. For Aristotle, "the good man is the norm and measure of each class of things." 
